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academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
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Game Theoretic Real Option Approach of the Procurement of 
Department of Defense: Competition or Collaboration 
Marc Rabaey—marc.rabaey@gmail.com 
Abstract 
The real option analysis for investments is well known. In order to make decisions 
(delay, stop, start up, continue), management is waiting to collect more information, 
or is waiting for a better environment (market situation, political situation and so on). 
However this is without taking into account the (inter)actions of the other players in 
the market. Option games will place the real options into a strategic (game theoretic) 
context., i.c. DoD for procurement. 
In reality, the complexity of real options and the need for the permanent monitoring of 
the environment make some managers reluctant to introduce it in the enterprise for 
investment decision-making. A generic framework “Intelligence Base” is being 
proposed to approach intelligence and game options in a holistic way for the strategy 
and the investments. 
Introduction 
The real option analysis for investments is well known. In order to make decisions 
(delay, stop, start up, continue), management is waiting to collect more information, or is 
waiting for a better environment (market situation, political situation and so on). However, 
this is without taking into account the (inter)actions of the other players in the market. Option 
games will place the real options into a strategic (game theoretic) context. 
As we will show, for the strategic interaction with other parties alone, an organization 
who wants to gain competitive or collaborative advantage, has to screen permanently its 
environment and its own functioning. 
Weeds (2006) points out that to use real options, the real options valuation (ROV) 
requires a detailed analysis of the full range of possible developments in the future and the 
probability of success of each one, not just the expected or average outcome. Furthermore, 
implementation of ROV requires managers to monitor the business environment to assess 
what should be done with the options. If they cannot bring up the effort to do so, then they 
are unlikely to achieves the values calculated using ROV. This and the complexity of ROV 
makes it difficult to implement ROV. 
The attentive reader will certainly remark that the effort to monitor the environment of 
the organization for strategic reasons, can also be used to collect information to implement 
and maintain the ROV and even more when both are combined in the option games. 
Therefore, we will propose a generic intelligence system that every organization can 
instantiate in function of its culture and capabilities. 
In what follows we will start from the art of war to develop a forum in which all 
decisions for investments and procurement can be made. In the next section the process of 
decision-making for that forum is discussed. In the Intelligence Base section and the 
Conceptual View on the Intelligence Base section we will propose a generic intelligence 
system, called intelligence base. The Investments section handles the combination of real 
options and game theory. Before we conclude, we will give an overview how a department 
of defense can use the game-theoretic approach of real options in the cases of collaboration 
  
 




and competition and how DoD can determine the possible strategy games for the suppliers 
(procurement). 
From Strategy to Action 
The Art of War 
To Bernard (1976), there are three principles of the Art of War: 
 Balance between Goals and Means, 
 Liberty of Action, and 
 Economy of Forces. 
Regarding the military (Hart, 1991; Bernard, 1976), grand strategy is the art to 
combine resources of an organization to attain its objectives. This is determined by the first 
principle of the Art of War, being the balance between objectives and resources. If a 
company uses too many resources to attain the objectives, then it is not efficient. If too few 
resources are used, then the company will not be effective and it will not attain its objectives. 
As a result of the balance between goals and means, two types of strategy will be 
derived from the grand strategy: the business strategy and the resources strategy. 
Examples of resources are human resources, financial resources and ICT.  
The business strategy will define strategic objectives that have to be attained by the 
(core) business units through their processes. Thus, the strategy itself is realized by 
business processes. These processes may belong to one or more organizations. 
The first principle has one rule: the permanent seeking of intelligence, inside and 
outside the organization. The balance between goals and means is about determination of 
the right objectives, given the environment and the available and/or possible needed 
resources related to these objectives. The result is the grand strategy of the entire 
organization. As a consequence of this balance, two other strategies can be derived: 
Business and Resources Strategies. The first is focused on the creation and the deployment 
of the core competences to attain the imposed objectives, while the latter is focused on the 
means and the processes to support the first (Rabaey et al., 2007a). 
The liberty of action is about security: avoiding, preventing as much as possible, 
hostile actions of other organizations and the assuring of the communication lines (logistics, 
information; for intelligence). The economy of forces treats the economical and right use of 
the resources (efficiency and effectiveness). 
The deeper in the hierarchy of the organization, the less impact the leaders have on 
the resources aspects and the scope of their business levels. Therefore, in the ever-faster 
changing world, the structure becomes less hierarchical, so flexibility is gained. This implies 
that these leaders (and/or managers) need to have access to more information and have a 
more extended information system. 
Interdisciplinary Forum 
Rabaey et al. (2007) define a business process as a logical set of activities that 
consumes resources to attain its objectives. In the organization of the business processes, 
we have the second alignment of goals and means. The resource managers and the 
business unit managers will discuss the operational use of resources (organization) in an 
interdisciplinary forum—interdisciplinary because of the multitude of functional domains 
  
 




(Rabaey et al., 2007a). The result is the providing of the resources and their service levels 
(SLA = Service Level Agreement). 
 
Figure 1. Interdisciplinary Forum 
From a business perspective, a resource or service provider will be evaluated on the 
delivery of the service (SLA) and the quality of service (QoS). The deployment of resources 
in a business process is the result of a decision process (of the interdisciplinary forum). If 
software must be able to choose and to deploy itself the resources and the modules of its 
capability, then it must be capable to understand the characteristics and the purposes to 
attain its imposed objectives. 
Different Games on Different Levels 
If we look at an organization as DoD, the organization can play different games at 
the same time in different domains. So, there is no such thing as a unique strategic game to 
play. 
Moreover, the underlying organizational elements can themselves play different 
games regarding the mother organization and regarding each other, even for a same 
project: IT can collaborate with third parties, while human resources are in competition with 
these parties. If there is no superstructure (like project management or business unit), then 
contradictory signals are sent to the market. 
Thus for the procurement of goods and services the strategy for that project, the 
chosen strategic game is that of the superstructure. The strategies (games) for the sub-
organizational units will be derived from that game. As such, suboptimal strategies are 
  
 




avoided in the request for proposal. It is the interdisciplinary forum that determines the 
strategy and rules for the procurement for that particular project.  
Enterprise Architecture 
The strategy of the project itself has to be aligned with the higher strategies and the 
already made investments (because most of them are irreversible, therefore there are sunk 
costs). The new project may change the investment plan, thus flexibility and adaptability are 
demanded. For that reason, real options are very useful. 
The changes of investment will reflect on the steering plan (see Figure 1). Since IT 
performs more and more an important role, it is necessary to have a framework in which IT 
can be situated in the function of the business. Enterprise Architecture (EA) is such a 
framework. The Enterprise Architecture Research Forum 
(http://earf.meraka.org.za/earfhome/) defines Enterprise Architecture as “the continuous 
practice of describing the essential elements of a socio-technical organization, their 
relationships to each other and to the environment, in order to understand complexity and 
manage change.” Therefore, Enterprise Architecture should consist of distinguished levels. 
The naming of the distinguished levels may differ, but in general at least EA should consist 
of Business Architecture, Information Architecture, Application Architecture, and 
Infrastructure Architecture (Rabaey et al., 2007a).  
Rabaey (2012) proposes to add an additional layer, namely Knowledge Architecture, 
because IT will become a utility (commodity) and competitive/collaborative advantage will 
become almost fully dependent from the capability of producing intelligence for decision-
making and knowledge management (in systems, processes and human resources). Some 
investment techniques use knowledge units (Housel & Bell, 2001) or  Knowledge Value 
Added (KVA) to assess investment probabilities (Mun & Housel, 2006).  
Decision-Making 
Uncertainty and Risk 
Real options are used to assess risk (Benaroch, Jeffery, Kauffman, & Shah, 2007) 
and uncertainty and take the appropriate measures and decisions. Both terms, risk and 
uncertainty, are interchanged because of the fact that the outcome is the same (expected 
values; Aven, 2010, p. 55), but semantically they are very different in the approach 
regarding decision-making.  
Organizations have to make important decisions (like investments) without complete 
information in a complex and fast changing environment. Uncertainty is a state in which the 
outcomes are unknown and perhaps unknowable; the more distant in time (future), the 
greater the uncertainty (Funston & Wagner, 2010, p. xxiii).  
There is a correlation between the level in the organization and the degree of 
uncertainty: the higher in the organization, the less explicit information exists, so the more 
uncertainties exist, and therefore the more intelligence it needs to reduce this uncertainty 
(see Figure 2). 
  
 





Figure 2. Lack of Formal Information 
(Rabaey et al., 2007) 
The decision horizon is further at the strategic level than at the operational or tactical 
levels of the organization. For most of the organizations in this ever-faster changing 
environment, the time line at the strategic level is from the present until the long term (at 
least a year), while the operational level is from now until short term (a couple of weeks or 
months at most). 
 
Figure 3. Time Horizon, Uncertainty and Volatility 
In Figure 3 the grand strategy determines the long term horizon (T4). The other 
arrows are indicating the quasi-certain period. For the business strategy business unit 2 
determines T3, IT causes T1 for Resources strategy, which may explain the shorter period 
  
 




T2 for the business process 2. The volatility is not a sum of the volatilities of the different 
units, rather a product. However, as stated above, there are different types of uncertainty, 
the approach to reduce the uncertainty is in function of the type. 
Frank Knight described two types of uncertainty: first, that in which probabilities are 
known or knowable (so expected), which he called risk. The Open Group defines risk as the 
probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss (“Risk,” n.d.). The second type is 
real uncertainty,1 which is not known or knowable. 
So risk is a measurable unknown, while certainty is an unmeasurable unknown. For 
the former, we can collect information to improve the already existing knowledge, while for 
the latter, an organization should collect information to “discover” it. The unmeasurable 
unknown can be divided in the known-unknown (the organization knows that it doesn’t know 
something) and the unknown-unknown (the organization is not aware that something exists).  
In any case, be it for risk or uncertainty, an organization should always be collecting 
intelligence (also the only rule for the first principle of the Art of War). To game theory, 
unknown-unknown facts can influence the strategy game and strategists are somehow, 
sometimes aware of it (intuition), while to real options only the known-unknown and risks are 
taken into account. 
OODA 
USAF Colonel John Boyd has developed an important concept on decision-making 
at the strategic, operational and tactical level: Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA). OODA is 
a decision-making process (see Figure 4). However, Osinga (2007) stresses that OODA-
loop is more than a decision-making process; it is a model of an organizational learning and 
adapting in which the element “Orient” plays an important role in the organizational 
adaptability. The capability to adapt to uncertainties and risks is one of the parameters to 
determine the volatility of a real option (Piesse & van de Putte, n.d.). 
 
Figure 4. OODA-Loop 
                                               
1 Lack of certainty. 
  
 




Dr. Norma Bubier (personal communication, March 30, 2011) refers to OODA as an 
organic process. The organization is interacting with its environment and has to interpret it to 
decide what, when, where, and how to act in function of the new information, culture, 
previous experiences (skill, knowledge) and organizational structure (genetic heritage). This 
implies that organization should always monitor the environment and itself to detect risks, 
and therefore also opportunities. 
Translated to the interdisciplinary forum, we can represent OODA as follows (see 
Figure 5): In an interactive and iterative way the interdisciplinary forum will decide with the 
superstructure what it should do. The superstructure will then communicate the sub-
organizational units (business units, and/or resources-units) what to attain as goals (in a 
coordinated way). The sub-organizational units will perform then their own OODA-loop to 
determine the best possible actions on their level. A similar interactive and iterative process 
for the intelligence cycle will below be discussed. 
 
Figure 5. OODA: Unit and Subunits 
Predictably Irrational 
Game theory explains with success the behavior of humans when they act rationally. 
However, it does the same for birds or fish, from which we cannot say that they have brains 
comparable with human brains. Binmore (2007, p. 5) states that rationality in game theory is 
about consistent behavior, not reasoning.  Therefore we may not automatically assume that 
by using game theory in the procurement domain, we imply that those decisions are made 
rationally.2 
Literature on behavioral economics (Ariely, 2009; Montier, 2010), intuitive 
management (Burke et al., 1999), psychology (Libet, 2011; Pucket & Purdy, 2011), 
naturalistic decision-making (NDM; Brooks, 2007; Berryman, 2007; Shattuck & Miller, 2006) 
proves that the decision-making is not always rational. A lot has to do with how people and 
their brains are coping with uncertainty and risk. Collecting intelligence can reduce 
uncertainties and handle better risks, what we will discuss in the next point. 
                                               
2 Which, of course, they may be. 
  
 





Need for Intelligence 
At all levels of the organization, uncertainty exists. However, the closer to the 
strategic level of the organization, the higher the uncertainty. This is because of the decision 
time horizon. The strategic level of an organization must give the general direction to which 
the whole organization has to evolve. 
It must be noted that uncertainties and risks are not always external the organization 
but also internal. Techniques such as Baldrige (n.d.) and Common Assessment Framework 
(CAF, n.d.) are used to assess the internal organization and to improve its working, which 
comes down to obtaining the right knowledge and information to attain the objectives of the 
organization and to use, in a rational way, its resources. 
In an economical context, rationality has more to do with the ratio of benefits to costs 
instead of the philosophical meaning of reasoning (“Rationality,” n.d.). It is not a surprise that 
even the first principle of the Art of War is to have the right balance between goals and 
means to decide which is the best strategic plan to adopt for preserving the best interest of a 
nation. The only but obligatory rule of this principle is the permanent collection of intelligence 
(Bernard, 1976). So to reduce its uncertainties to make better decisions, the organization 
will collect intelligence.  
Funston and Wagner (2010, p. xxiii) write the following: 
The risk intelligent enterprise recognizes that risk intelligence and risk 
management are not ends in themselves but a means toward the ends of 
creating and preserving value and surviving and thriving in uncertainty. Risk 
intelligence is an approach to conducting business that improves decision 
making and judgment in vital areas and initiatives. After all, to be enterprising 
means to be bold and willing to undertake new initiatives that involve risk. 
The Defense Security Service document (DSS, 2005) states,  
Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, 
integration, and interpretation of all available information, that concerns one or 
more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of foreign operations, and that is 
immediately or potentially significant to military planning and operations. 
This is done by the intelligence cycle process. However, not only intelligence is obtained for 
the decision-making process, also, knowledge can be created with this process. This is not 
surprising because knowledge is also used to make decisions (Courtney, 2001). 
Intelligence Cycle 
The intelligence manager has the following resources in the so-called intelligence 
cycle: the memory (where all acquired information is stored), the network (of sensors) and 
the analysis capability. The latter analyzes all incoming information and processes it into 
intelligence that will be stored into the memory. In the scheme of Besson and Possin (2003) 
in Figure 6, the “unknown” actively drives the intelligence cycle; however, it is the sensors 
that collect the information, which can be of use to the organization. 
  
 





Figure 6. Intelligence Cycles 
The most difficult task is to formulate and translate the question into a clear 
language, which would then lead the organization to the pertinent and relevant information. 
In other words, it conveys knowledge about opportunities and threats, which the 
organization (Kahaner, 1997) ignores (Besson & Possin, 2003, p. 22). 
Larry Kahaner (1997) sees the intelligence cycle as a process instead of a function. 
“Therefore it should appear in all aspects of your business as one seamless, continuous 
activity not relegated to one area, division or unit” (Kahaner, 1997, p. 23). This process has 
four steps: Planning & Direction, Collection, Analysis and Dissemination (Kahaner, 1997, p. 
43).  
The step “Planning & Direction” starts with a clear understanding of the user’s needs 
and includes his time constraints. Once well understood, further intelligence actions are 
planned. The step “Collection” involves obtaining raw information that can be turned into 
usable intelligence for the decision-making of an organization.3 “Analysis” is the process of 
taking information and integrating it with other information so that intelligence is created. 
“Dissemination” is distribution of the intelligence towards the client and other organizations 
that may also be concerned by this intelligence. 
Knowledgebase (KnB) 
Guida et al. (1994) defines a knowledge-based system (KBS) as a software system 
capable of supporting the explicit representation of knowledge in some specific competence 
domain and of exploiting it through appropriate reasoning mechanisms in order to provide 
high-level problem-solving performance. The knowledgebase stores available knowledge 
concerning the domain at hand, represented in appropriate explicit form and ready to be 
used by the reasoning mechanism. 
                                               
3 Mainly two types of information exist: primary and secondary. Primary information comes directly from the 
information sources. Secondary information is coming from other sources then primary sources, which have 
altered the “raw facts.” 
  
 




Is intelligence also knowledge? For Peter Drucker (1998) knowledge is information 
effective in action so information focuses on results. Sanchez and Heene (1997) define 
“knowledge as the set of beliefs held by an individual about causal relationships among 
phenomena. Causal relationships in this definition are cause and effect relationships 
between imaginable events or actions and likely consequences of those events or actions. 
Organizational knowledge is then defined as the shared set of beliefs about causal 
relationships held by individuals within a group.” 
Therefore, both terms (intelligence and knowledge) are supporting the decision-
making process and these terms are sometimes interchanged (Kahaner, 1997, p.21) or 
confused with information. It is, however, clear that interpreted and integrated information 
becomes intelligence, which enables the person to make a decision using the inference 
rules of the concerned knowledge domain.  
Yet knowledge evolves, facts stay. Therefore, an organization should store the facts 
(information) in a “Facts Base” for later re-interpreting the same facts but with other 
knowledge. Besides tracking the intelligence, an organization should place the intelligence 
on a dedicated storage “Interpreted Information Base” to assess the quality of intelligence 
(Besson & Possin, 2001). 
Using the same logic as intelligence assessment, the decision-making process can 
be assessed (Yates, 2003) and thus the knowledge. Sanchez and Heene (1997) define 
three types of knowledge: factual knowledge (entities, relationships), inferential knowledge 
(reasoning functions) and strategic knowledge (problem-solving strategies). 
Unknown Base 
If an organization knows what it knows, then it knows what it does not know but 
would like to know. The Unknown Base supports the management of the unknown. The 
whole system of detecting, managing and collecting the unknown is very strategic for an 
organization. If its competitor/enemy knows what the organization does not know, then the 
competitor/enemy can take advantage of this. Security is of the utmost importance. 
In what follows, the conceptual, strategic and operational level of the Intelligence 
Base will be discussed. 
Conceptual View on the Intelligence Base 
Components 
The Dictionary of Military Terms (DoD, 1999) defines an Intelligence Data Base as 
“The sum of holdings of intelligence data and finished intelligence products at a given 
organization.” The term “data” is too limited in the context of intelligence (OMB, n.d.); 
moreover, we have added the management of the Unknown, and therefore we suggest the 
term “Intelligence Base.”4  The management and the storages of the unknown, the facts and 
intelligence, and the supporting Intelligence Information system form together the 
“Intelligence Base” (IntB; see Figure 7). 
                                               
4 Section based on Rabaey et al. (2005). 
  
 





Figure 7. Intelligence Base Concept 
Every level of the organization, be it strategic, operational or tactical, interacts with its 
environment, which gives opportunities to collect information (push or pull, see below) about 
that environment. The collected information should be transferred via a special and 
dedicated communication system of the intelligence information system (Int IS), which 
supports the Intelligence Base.  
Figure 8 shows similarities with OODA-loop of the interdisciplinary forum (see Figure 
5), which is logic because they are intimately interwoven with each other. 
 
Figure 8. Cascading Intelligence Processes 
  
 




Decision Making and Intelligence Process 
Before handling the triggers, “it is important to always link information to the decision 
making process. Only pertinent information and information that increases the knowledge 
base need be processed. All other information may remain unprocessed or discarded.” 
(Morua & Bruns, 2002). In our system the processed information becoming intelligence is 
placed in the Interpreted Information Base, while the facts (processed or not), went to the 
Facts Base. The knowledge base is composed of the Interpreted Information Base and 
Facts Base. How does this information come into the system? 
Two events can trigger an interaction between the decision-making process and the 
intelligence process. Firstly, the decision-maker expresses an intelligence need. The second 
trigger is the transmission of newly detected facts by the sensors. Of course, the intelligence 
process can also express intelligence needs. 
The case of “Information Pull” is when the decision-maker does not find the 
necessary intelligence (in the Intelligence Base or outside of it), then he expresses his need 
to the “Planning & Direction.” The latter will then define the needed intelligence actions. The 
needed information may not be in the Intelligence Base in which case the network has to be 
instructed (push). The planning of the dynamic search-path is established (Besson & 
Possin, 2001) and the plan of action is managed in the Unknown Base. 
The resulting information (if any) is then analyzed. Additional information may be 
required if there is not enough information to be integrated into intelligence. Once the 
intelligence is acquired, then it will be disseminated to the intelligence client. The information 
and intelligence are stored respectively in the Facts Base and the Interpreted Information 
Base, and the Unknown Base is updated. 
In the case of “Information Push” the sensors are injecting information in the network 
(push). The transmitted information is then analyzed. If the information can be integrated, 
then the resulting intelligence is pushed to the concerned people and/or organizations. The 
information and intelligence (if any) are stored respectively in the Facts Base and the 
Interpreted Information Base. 
Investments 
Real Options and Game Theory 
The classic investment methodologies like Net Present Value (NPV) and Return of 
Investment (ROI) are lacking the flexibility that management need to be able to postpone, 
delay, start, and abandon projects.  
Real Option Analysis (ROA) gives management this flexibility, and it tackles the 
problem of uncertainty and risk related to each investment. Options are the right but not the 
obligation to execute an action (sell or buy). Translated to real option, it means that 
management can decide to postpone, stop, start, restart or put on hold a project. The 
reasons may be because of the lack of relevant information, or to wait for results of some 
pilot projects. 
Although ROA is known in the IT-world, our study of recent literature on Cloud 
Computing shows that this literature is still referring to ROI and NPV. Besides the reasons 
mentioned in the introduction, another reason is that most of the books are written by 
technology people. Therefore, this subject gives the possibility to introduce ROA, also in the 
philosophy of more technical business environments, like Cloud Computing. ROA, however, 
  
 




has a common drawback, like the classic investment techniques, being the lack of taking 
into account the interaction of the organization with its environment (market, government, 
etc.). The solution is to combine ROA with game theory, which resulted in the theory of 
option games (Rabaey, 2011). 
Mono-Game and Multi-Game Options 
Game theory on its own analyzes complexities of the equilibriums and the payoffs 
into detail by determining players’ utility functions without any relation to market values. Real 
options analysis places these payoff values under uncertainty, considering market values 
and the flexibility of response by the optimal exercise of the options.  
However, because the actual actions (and necessary actual decisions) seem to 
erode partly the value of waiting. This is the main reproach that we can find in the literature 
on the option games. Our approach brings both theories together in another way. 
Real options are a set of chains of future decisions. In order to make decisions 
(delay, stop, start up, continue), management is waiting to collect more information, or is 
waiting for a better environment (market situation, political situation and so on). The situation 
has to be assessed at that moment in the future, but we will place it in a game theoretic 
context. Our proposal is not only a chain of possible decisions (as in the non-interactive 
original version of real options), but also a chain of possible interaction situations 
represented by games. 
Every decision node consists of two phases. The first is to assess the situation in 
which the decision has to be made, in other words the probable payoff matrix of the game. 
The second phase is to determine the value of the real option based on this payoff matrix. 
If the convention is to always take the same game, then we call this the mono-game 
chain of options. A more complex version is to consider more than one game, and therefore 
determine the value of the real option for each game (and its corresponding payoff matrix). 
As a result, each node with multiple games (in the so called multi-game chain of options) will 
generate more branches than in the case of a mono-game chain of options. 
  
 





Figure 9. Mono-Game and Multi-Game Options 
In the upper part of Figure 9 we see the representation of a mono-game option in a 
decision tree, while the lower part represents a multi-game option. The latter has a tendency 
to become a chaotic (although deterministic) system after a certain point in the time 
horizon.5  To select the more relevant games, meaning reducing the number of possible 
games, it is necessary that the organization collects intelligence about the possibilities on 
collaborating or competing with one or more actors in the market. Otherwise the system will 
overload itself. 
DoD Procurement in Competition and in Collaboration 
In general, there are two kinds of situations: competition and collaboration. We will 
first discuss the competition situation, but before we are referring to Weeds (2006) with the 
remark that certain urgent events force the organization to act immediately. We will integrate 
the elements of Weeds (2006) in our discussion. But again it indicates that an organization 
should permanently screen its environment, and therefore implement an instance of the 
intelligence base. It must be stressed that even organizations that are not using ROV must 
implement a similar system, otherwise it will miss opportunities and run more risks. 
First or Second Mover 
The DoD of a country is in competition with other DoD or government agencies to 
obtain from the limited number of suppliers, the capabilities to produce goods or to deliver 
services. In function of the strategic importance, the DoD can chose between a first mover 
(leader, innovator), or a second mover (follower). 
                                               
5 More research will be done on this subject. 
  
 




The first mover advantage (FMA) is when the DoD invests first, rather than 
continuing to delay, and the competitor continues to delay. The invested cost can be seen 
as a basis investment for further options, while the DoD as first mover has as advantage 
that there will be a strong alignment of the “new” capabilities on its own strategy. A second 
advantage is that for a limited time the DoD has a monopoly and can create market 
conditions for the suppliers and, not to forget, also the customers of the suppliers (see the 
DoD as Regulator in the Market for Its Own Procurement Environment section). However, it 
is not without any risk. If it fails, then the competitor who has delayed can take advantage of 
the mistakes of the first mover (this is an example of a Second Mover Benefit, SMB). 
To be a second mover can have many causes.6  First of all, the DoD had not enough 
information to reduce its uncertainty or to mitigate the risks. Then, with the information 
coming from the actions (failure or not) of the competitor, the DoD can reevaluate the 
situation and improve its payoffs. 
The DoD can also consider saving the costs of being the first mover, but it will have 
to adapt to the solution of the first mover, by sacrificing some of the strategic objectives, or 
part of it, unless the first mover has failed. In the latter case, the second mover can take the 
lessons learned to determine a better strategy to obtain the necessary capabilities, as 
already mentioned previously. 
It can even be a strategy that the follower wants the other one (pushed in the role of 
leader) to move as first, so that the latter can come with a better strategy or products or gain 
better resources (or methodologies) and hope that the follower becomes the leader. 
Weeds (2006) states that FMA tends to conflict with real options because there is a 
threat of preemption of a rival; however, that is more the now-or-never situation (see below). 
FMA comes from the strategic (competitive) advantage (opportunity) of that moment. By 
investing (consuming cash flow), the DoD hopes to create more potential for the future (for 
attaining the objectives of the political governance) and knows that a possible reaction of the 
follower can come. In the case of now-or-never, the initiative is not exclusively for the leader. 
As for the game-theoretic aspect, the DoD as first mover must be aware that the 
competitors will react. These reactions can undermine the FMA; therefore, the DoD should 
not only consider its own actions but also the reactions of the competitors and the influence 
of these reactions on its own payoffs—in the case of leader-follower game. Therefore, from 
the point of view of the leader, the DoD will establish two payoffs matrix, one for the case 
that the follower reacts quickly, and one for the case that the follower continues delaying any 
action. By creating intelligence (collecting and analyzing information), the organization can 
better determine the utility functions and the probable reaction of the follower and its impact 
on its own payoffs. 
Now-or-Never 
There is a third type of competition in which the DoD is obtaining simultaneously the 
scarce resources. This is the case when it is strategically important to have a specific 
system (or goods or services) and therefore has to compete with other agencies. In this the 
competitive pressures to obtain the resources or goods/services are strong and the cost of 
being preempted is considerably high, then waiting can cause considerable damage by 
losing the investment opportunities to its competitors. 
                                               
6 If the DoD does not have the capabilities to invest (for any kind of reason), then this is obviously not an active 
strategy, and we can speak of a “mover.” 
  
 




This is a now-or-never opportunity where the option has no value anymore and 
classic investment techniques can be used. It is not a failure of the system of real options, 
only strategic (game) considerations oblige DoD to act as soon as possible. Of course, the 
decision can have significant influence on other projects or investments, of which the option 
values can change dramatically. Therefore, it is not because of the fact that real options 
have not been used in an urgent case that the decision nodes along the scenarios tree don’t 
need an ROV anymore. 
It must be clear that the DoD has to develop (strategic) scenarios in which not only 
first and second mover must be taken into consideration but also the now-or-never 
situations. 
Unknown-Unknown 
Another situation can be a lack of information on the part of the DoD, resulting in it being 
unaware of the competition for capabilities of other agencies (silent or secret negotiation 
phase), so an unknown-unknown situation. 
Collaboration 
The second situation for DoD procurement is collaboration. It is in a common interest 
that the DoD of a country collaborates with allies (p.e. NATO). Collaboration does not 
necessary mean that the DoD is in a less stressful situation. “Missing the boat” to 
collaborate can be as disastrous as in competition. However, most of the time, the context of 
collaboration is determined by the higher political bodies of a nation. 
In the cases of repeated games, the game theory, linked with the real option 
analysis, can be used by a DoD of a country to steer the decisions in a best possible way to 
obtain the strategic objectives.  However, this subject is still in the phase of research.7 
DoD as Regulator in the Market for Its Own Procurement Environment 
Regulator 
The strategic objectives determine the functional requirements of the goals, where 
the resource strategy is determining the technical requirements based on standards, policy 
or doctrine of use. The request for procurement or proposal is then published to the 
suppliers (market). As seen previously, when the DoD was itself submitted to the market 
strategic games, the suppliers can be put in two situations: competition or collaboration 
(coordination). 
In this case we don’t use the game theory to position the DoD in the market, but as 
the organization which creates a particular micro-environment for the suppliers, a market 
regulator for its own procurement. As a matter of fact, the DoD is creating the game theory 
framework in which the suppliers will interact with each other. We will focus us more on the 
procurement of IT-related items. 
In the case of competition only, the DoD will enforce its own standards or the market 
standards. The best possible proposal will be chosen. 
                                               
7 The research extends also to drama theory and the theory of Bryant (2003). 
  
 




Competition followed by collaboration is the particular situation in which the DoD will 
let different suppliers compete based on the competences (capability), and it creates a 
short-list for each capability. Afterwards, the DoD creates an environment in which the 
chosen suppliers are encouraged to chose one or more partners to collaborate so that the 
main capability can be formed. 
This is a more active steering of the formation of collaborative suppliers than the next 
situation: collaborate and competition. If a project is too big for a single company (supplier) 
then the interested suppliers will look for themselves to find the best partner to collaborate 
with. So the market itself will be clustering the different players into ad hoc entities. Once 
these entities are formed the competition can start. 
Collaborate: In the situation in which there are no clear standards for a specific 
system, this collaboration of interested suppliers will produce and propose standards. Here 
the DoD can also play an active role to determine the to-be-developed standard(s). 
Monopolist of Demand 
As a matter of fact, in the “market of (legal) violence” the DoD has the monopoly of 
demand. The very specific attributes of the defense market of some weapon systems make 
so that the DoD is confronted on the supply side with a oligopoly (of big players). The 
subject of oligopoly or duopoly with option games is well documented in the literature. We 
propose that the DoD use game theory to follow up the “ethical” and “economical” 
collaborations and competitions (no cartel for instance).  
However, because of the globalization of the market, it is possible that in some parts 
of the market (of “violence”) the DoD will lose its monopoly due to the fact that the 
technology demand has been taken over by commercial companies or other government 
agents.  
Conclusions 
Although for strategic reasons an organization should create intelligence to 
determine the best way to allocate resources to attain its goals, reality shows that besides 
the complexity, real options are not easily implemented because of the ongoing effort to 
collect information to maintain the real option valuation. 
Therefore, we are proposing two processes, one to obtain intelligence (intelligence 
base) and one to decide the investments and to maintain the steering plans and service 
level agreements (interdisciplinary forum). The organization can instantiate from these 
generic processes their own systems in function of its culture and capabilities. 
Since the intelligence base delivers relevant information for determining the 
strategies (game theory) and for the interdisciplinary forum (real options, other investment 
techniques), the combination of both, namely game options, can also be supported. 
However, to exploit effectively game options, some further research has to be done, 
especially in the domain of collaboration. 
In our discussion we also came to the conclusion that it is the situation in which the 
strategic games are played that determines if real options (game options) are used or not. 
Some urgent problems in the business environment of the organization may oblige the 
organization to choose other investment techniques than real options. The organization has 
the right but not the obligation to use real options (in certain circumstances). 
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